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Louis Jones Jr. had the dubious
honor of being the first defendant
tried under the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"), 18
U.S.C. § 3591-98. The FDPA dic-
tates that if the government intends
to seek the death penalty, it must
prove the existence of one or more
statutory aggravating circumstances
during the sentencing phase of the
trial. During this phase, the FDPA
allows the defendant to submit evi-
dence relevant to eight statutory
mitigating circumstances, including
"other factors in the defendant's
background, record, or character or
any other circumstance of the
offense that mitigates against impo-
sition of the death sentence."
As to aggravating factors, the jury
must unanimously determine that
an aggravating factor exists.
However, jurors individually decide
on mitigating factors; thus one or
more members of the jury may find
a mitigating factor. If the jury finds
at least one aggravating factor, the
jury must decide whether the aggra-
vating factors outweigh any mitigat-
ing factors to justify a sentence of
death. The jury then recommends
by unanimous vote a sentence of
death, of life imprisonment, or of
"some other lesser sentence."
In his argument before the Supreme
Court, Jones takes issue not with
the validity of the FDPA itself but
with the trial court's jury instruc-
tions that could have led the jury to
believe that the lack of a unanimous
verdict for either life or death would
have allowed the judge to impose a
less severe sentence. The FDPA
states that if the jury recommends a
sentence of either life imprisonment
or of death, "the court shall sen-
tence the defendant accordingly.
Otherwise, the court shall impose
any lesser sentence that is autho-
rized by law." 18 U.S.C. § 3594.
Thus the statute, argues Jones, lim-
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its the options of the jury to a sen-
tence of either life imprisonment or
death. Where the jury does not rec-
ommend either of these, the only
remaining option is to allow the
judge to determine "some other
lesser sentence" according to rele-
vant law. Yet some crimes, such as
kidnapping resulting in death-the
offense committed by Jones-
require a punishment of death or
life imprisonment; no lesser offense
is legally authorized. 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a).
This case raises the question of
whether the judge's instructions, the
instructions on the jury forms, and
the judge's refusal to clarify his sen-
tencing obligations could have con-
fused jurors about the consequences
of their recommendation. Specific-
ally, the question is whether individ-
ual jurors who favored life imprison-
ment but were in the minority could
have concluded that their failure to
vote for death with the majority
would lead to a verdict lacking una-
nimity, thus allowing the judge to
impose a sentence less than life
imprisonment.
ISSUES
The Supreme Court must decide
whether it is reasonably likely that
the jury instructions in this case led
the jury to believe that its failure to
decide upon either life imprison-
ment or death would result in a
court-imposed sentence less than
life imprisonment and whether
Jones was entitled to a specific
instruction that federal law would
have required a court-imposed sen-
tence of life imprisonment.
In addition, the Court must decide
whether the submission to the jury
of two aggravating factors relating to
the victim's physical and personal
characteristics, which the Fifth
Circuit found invalid, constituted
"harmless error," not requiring a
reversal of Jones' death sentence.
FACTS
On February 19, 1995, Louis Jones
Jr. kidnapped, sexually assaulted,
and bludgeoned to death Tracie Joy
McBride, a 19-year-old Army private
who had arrived only eight days ear-
lier at Goodfellow Air Force Base in
San Angelo, Texas. The day before,
Jones' ex-wife had made a final
break with him. After repeatedly lis-
tening to a recording of this conver-
sation with his wife and consuming
a substantial amount of alcohol,
Jones went to Goodfellow Air Force
Base where he believed his ex-wife
was on duty. Instead he found Pri-
vate McBride, who bore a strong
physical resemblance to his ex-wife.
Jones was convicted of kidnapping
resulting in the death of McBride
and of assaulting Michael Peacock,
an Army private who had attempted
to prevent the kidnapping.
At the sentencing hearing, the gov-
ernment presented evidence on the
four statutory aggravating circum-
stances that it alleged: that Jones
had caused the death of McBride
while committing the offense of kid-
napping; that in the commission of
the offense Jones knowingly created
a grave risk of death to one or more
persons; that Jones committed the
offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, and depraved manner involv-
ing torture or serious physical
abuse; and that Jones committed
the offense after substantial plan-
ning and premeditation. In addition,
the government submitted evidence
on three nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances: Jones as a future
danger to the lives and safety of oth-
ers; McBride's young age, slight
stature, background, and unfamiliar-
ity with San Angelo, Texas;
McBride's personal characteristics
and the effect of the offense on her
family.
Jones presented evidence to support
the following 11 mitigating circum-
stances: that Jones did not have a
significant prior criminal record;
that his capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct was sig-
nificantly impaired; that Jones com-
mitted the offense under severe
emotional distress; that Jones had
been subjected to physical, sexual,
and emotional abuse as a child; that
Jones served the United States well
in the Army for 22 years; that Jones
is likely to be a well-behaved
inmate; that Jones is remorseful;
that his daughter will suffer emo-
tional trauma if he is executed; that
Jones was under substantial stress
at the time of the offense; that
Jones suffered from numerous neu-
rological or psychological disorders;
and that other factors about his
background militate against the
death penalty.
Before the case was submitted to
the jury for sentencing, Jones asked
the judge to instruct the jury that
failure to reach a unanimous deci-
sion as to life imprisonment or
death would result in a judge-
imposed sentence of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of
release. The reason for this request
was to ensure that the jury did not
think that the option of "some other
lesser sentence" would allow the
judge to sentence Jones to a sen-
tence less severe than life. In addi-
tion, Jones requested an instruction
that would have required the jury to
return a verdict of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of
parole if any one of the jurors was
"not persuaded that justice demand-
ed Jones's execution." The district
court judge rejected these proposed
instructions.
After explaining to the jury the
process of weighing the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the
judge instructed the jury to come to
a unanimous verdict as to one of the
three options-death, life imprison-
ment without the possibility of
(Continued on Page 274)
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release, or some other lesser sen-
tence. The judge then told the jury
that a recommendation of either
death or life imprisonment without
the possibility of release required
the judge to impose the jury's rec-
ommended sentence. However,
instructed the judge, if the jury rec-
ommended some other lesser sen-
tence, the court would be required
to impose a sentence authorized by
law.
The judge instructed the jury "not
to be concerned with the question
of what sentence the defendant
might receive in the event [the jury]
determine[s] not to recommend a
death sentence or a sentence of life
without the possibility of release.
That is a matter for the court to
decide in the event [the jury] con-
clude[s] that a sentence of death or
life without the possibility of release
should not be recommended." At a
later point in the instructions, the
court reminded the jury that "in
order to bring back a verdict recom-
mending the punishment of death
or life without possibility of release,
all twelve of you must unanimously
vote in favor of such specific
penalty."
The judge gave the jury four verdict
forms with which to record a deci-
sion. The jury was to use Form B if
it "unanimously recommend[ed]
that a sentence of death should be
imposed." The judge further
instructed the jury to use either
Form C or D if it determined that a
sentence of death should not be
imposed because the aggravating
factor or factors did not outweigh
any mitigating factor or factors, the
aggravating factors or factors were
insufficient to justify a sentence of
death, or the jury was unable to
reach unanimity in recommending a
death sentence. The court then reit-
erated that the jury should use
Form C if it "unanimously recom-
mend[ed] that a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibili-
ty of release should be imposed ... "
and Form D was to be used if the
jury "recommendled] that some
other lesser sentence should be
imposed."
While Jones had requested clarify-
ing instructions, he did not express-
ly object to the instructions given
by the court or to the language in
the verdict forms.
The jury found that the government
had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of two statutory
aggravating circumstances: that
Jones caused the death of McBride
during the commission of the
offense of kidnapping and that Jones
had committed the offense in an
especially heinous, cruel, and
depraved manner. The jury also
made unanimous findings as to two
of the nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstances: McBride's young age,
slight stature, background, and
unfamiliarity with San Angelo and
McBride's personal characteristics
and the effect of the offense on her
family. Members of the jury found
the existence of 10 of the 11 miti-
gating circumstances submitted by
the defendant and wrote in the
name of Jones' ex-wife as an addi-
tional mitigating factor. The jury
returned a unanimous verdict rec-
ommending death.
Jones appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. United
States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232
(1998). The Court of Appeals reject-
ed Jones' arguments regarding the
jury instructions given by the dis-
trict court as well as the failure to
give the clarifying instructions he
had requested. The Fifth Circuit
panel stated that a district court
does not commit a constitutional
violation when it refuses to instruct
the jury of the consequences of fail-
ing to reach a unanimous verdict.
The panel conceded that the jury
forms could have confused the jury
but said that such confusion was
cured by the judge's instructions.
In addition, the panel stated that
because the FDPA does not super-
sede substantive criminal provi-
sions, the district court erred when
it told the jury of the lesser sen-
tence option. However, since Jones
failed to object to the instruction at
trial, the court applied the more dif-
ficult "plain error" standard. The
court concluded that since this was
the first case to interpret the FDPA,
the error was not "plain"-in other
words, not "clear or obvious." The
Fifth Circuit also held that the affi-
davits of two jurors used to establish
jury confusion were barred under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Jones
did not appeal the determination as
to the affidavits.
However, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with Jones that both nonstatutory
aggravating factors regarding
McBride's physical and personal
characteristics were duplicative,
vague, and overbroad. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the
death sentence, finding that the
errors as to these nonstatutory
aggravating factors were harmless.
That is, "the death sentence would
have been imposed beyond a rea-
sonable doubt had the invalid aggra-
vating factors never been submitted
to the jury."
The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari on October 5, 1998.
CASE ANALYSIS
Jones' arguments with respect to
the jury instructions involve issues
regarding the correct interpretation
of provisions of the FDPA, the
Supreme Court's supervisory role
over the lower federal courts, and
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
In addition, his appeal raises com-
plex issues as to the appropriate
level of review of alleged errors.
Issue No. 5
Essentially, the argument regarding
the jury instructions poses the ques-
tion of their possible effect in the
following scenario. What if most of
the jurors were in favor of the death
penalty for Jones, but a few were
holding out for a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of
release? That is, if the jurors were
deadlocked and could have reason-
ably believed that their inability to
come to a unanimous verdict would
have resulted in a court-imposed
sentence less than life without the
possibility of release, the concern is
that the few who were in favor of
life imprisonment might have
changed their vote to death in order
to avoid the judge imposing a less
severe sentence. Jones' argument is
that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the instructions and the verdict
forms caused such jury confusion.
In fact, Jones submitted affidavits
from two jurors confirming that the
jury was confused.
Jones argues that the FDPA requires
appellate review for "passion, preju-
dice, or any other arbitrary factor"
and that an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the jury instructions is such
a factor. This language mirrors that
of the Georgia death penalty statute
approved by the Supreme Court in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976). State courts interpreting
similarly worded statutes have held
that the possibility that the jury
misinterpreted the jury instructions
makes the finding by the jury arbi-
trary. See e.g., State v. Lindsey, 404
So.2d 466 (La. 1981). Given the
possible confusion in this case,
Jones argues that the Supreme
Court should reverse his death sen-
tence even though he made no spe-
cific objection to the instructions or
to the language in the verdict forms.
Alternatively, Jones argues that the
Supreme Court should correct the
instructional error based on the
Court's supervisory role over the
lower federal courts.
Jones also makes two constitutional
arguments with respect to the jury
instructions. He argues that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punish-
ment and the Fifth Amendment due
process clause require that juries be
given accurate information during
the sentencing phase to "minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 189.
With respect to the instructions
requested by Jones at trial, his argu-
ment centers on an interpretation of
the FDPA. To demonstrate that his
offered instructions correctly stated
the law, Jones asserts that under the
FDPA, if the jury is deadlocked-
that is, if it is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to a sentence
of death or of life imprisonment-
the judge is to impose a sentence
authorized by law. Jones points to
the provision quoted above, which
states that the judge is to impose
either life or death as recommended
unanimously by the jury. "Other-
wise, the court shall impose any
lesser sentence." In addition, Jones
cites the Judiciary Committee's
Report on the FDPA, which states,
"If the jury is not unanimous, the
judge shall impose the sentence....
Based on this interpretation, Jones
argues that his offered instructions
correctly stated the law and that
they were necessary to ensure that
the jury had accurate sentencing
information and did not speculate
on the effect of a nonunanimous
sentence. Jones argues the trial
court's refusal to give the requested
instructions correcting the error
requires reversal based on essential-
ly the same statutory and constitu-
tional reasons set out above.
The government responds first by
arguing that it is unlikely that the
jury misinterpreted the instructions
of the trial judge in the way Jones
claims. Further, the judge initially
told the jurors that they had to find
unanimously as to one of the three
sentencing options. The mere fact
that the judge did not repeat the
unanimity requirement each time
he referred to "some other lesser
sentence" would not have led the
jury to conclude that a lack of una-
nimity as to life or death would
have automatically resulted in a less
severe judge-imposed sentence. In
addition, the government claims
that any lack of clarity with respect
to the sentencing forms was cleared
by the same initial instruction that
the jury return a unanimous verdict
as to one of the three options.
The government further argues that
even if there could have been jury
confusion, Jones did not object to
the instructions, and thus the
Supreme Court should not reverse
due to the plain error rule. The pur-
pose of the plain error rule is to
ensure that parties make objections
at trial so that the trial court has an
opportunity to correct any errors. If
a party does not object at trial, he
or she must show that the error was
obvious and that it prejudiced the
party. As to the obviousness of the
error, the government claims that
since there had been no prior inter-
pretation of the FDPA, it was not
clear whether Jones could have
received a lesser sentence under the
Act when this would have conflicted
with the provision requiring a mini-
mum of life for kidnapping resulting
in death.
As to Jones' burden to show preju-
dice, the government essentially
argues that, in contrast to the hypo-
thetical suggested by Jones' argu-
ments, quite the opposite could
have occurred. That is, the jury
instructions could have benefited
Jones because a majority of jurors
could have been in favor of life, and
the few in favor of death changed
(Continued on Page 276)
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their vote to avoid a less severe sen-
tence imposed by the court. Given
the uncertainty as to the effect of
any error, contends the government,
Jones failed to show prejudice.
As to the statutory bases for review
argued by Jones, the government
claims that erroneous jury instruc-
tions do not constitute an "arbitrary
factor," but merely a legal error to
which an objection at trial must be
made.
Finally, as to the instructions
offered by Jones, the government
argues that these do not accurately
state the law. The government
claims that the FDPA clearly states
in one provision that the jury is to
reach a unanimous finding as to one
of the three options-death, life, or
some other lesser sentence. Thus, a
lack of unanimity would not auto-
matically result in a lesser sentence.
Rather, such an occurrence would
simply require a retrial as to
sentencing.
In support of this argument, the
government points to another provi-
sion that allows the court to impan-
el another jury for the sentencing
phase upon determining that "good
cause" exists to discharge the prior
jury. This provision indicates that
Congress intended to accommodate
the general rule that the prosecu-
tion may seek a retrial on the sen-
tence if the jury is deadlocked. The
government cited to the statutes of
20 states that expressly provide for
a judge-imposed sentence if the jury
is unable to agree on a sentence of
either life or death and four that
imply such a result. Furthermore,
the government contends that Jones
is not entitled to an instruction
regarding the consequences of a
jury deadlock when there has been
no indication that the jury is in
fact unable to reach a unanimous
verdict.
In his petition before the Supreme
Court, Jones relies on the determi-
nation by the Fifth Circuit that the
trial court erred when it allowed the
prosecution to submit two nonstatu-
tory aggravating factors relating to
the personal and physical character-
istics of the victim. However, Jones
disputes the Fifth Circuit's conclu-
sion that such error was harmless.
Jones argues that the harmless-error
analysis by the court of appeals was
insufficient and conclusory because
it did not discuss the evidence pre-
sented on the aggravating and miti-
gating factors, the weight the jury
might have given such factors, or
the 11 mitigating factors found by
the jurors. Furthermore, Jones
claims that the government failed to
meet its burden of showing that the
errors were harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
The government first disputes the
Fifth Circuit's finding that it was
error to submit the two nonstatuto-
ry aggravating factors to the jury.
The government argues that the fac-
tors relating to the victim's "young
age, slight stature, background, and
unfamiliarity with San Angelo" and
her "personal characteristics and
the effect of the offense on her fami-
ly" did not give the jury the type of
open-ended discretion invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Second, the government claims that
even if the erroneous aggravating
factors had not been submitted to
the jury, it is beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have still
recommended the death penalty.
The government claims that the
prosecutor relied primarily on the
statutory aggravating factors and
therefore the nonstatutory factors
were not of very much importance.
SIGNIFICANCE
Most of the arguments in this case
are narrow and factually specific.
The case is nonetheless significant
because it is the first case tried
under the Federal Death Penalty Act
of 1994. The Court might use this
case to shed some light on how it
will interpret certain provisions of
the FDPA. First, the Court may
decide whether the third option of
''some other lesser sentence"
requires jury unanimity. One provi-
sion states that unanimity is
required as to all three options.
However, another provision requires
the judge to impose the jury's rec-
ommended sentence of either life or
death and then states that
"Otherwise, the court shall impose
any lesser sentence that is autho-
rized by law." This language sug-
gests that the jury's failure to reach
unanimity will result in a default
jury recommendation of "some
other lesser sentence."
Second, the FDPA does not contain
a provision setting out what is to
happen if the jury is deadlocked. If
the FDPA requires jury unanimity
and the jury does not reach a unani-
mous sentence, does the court
impose a sentence or is there a
retrial on the issue of sentencing?
The government itself cites to at
least 20 jurisdictions that follow
such a procedure rather than
require the judge to order a retrial
on the issue of sentencing.
In addition, this case presents the
Supreme Court with an opportunity
to issue an opinion signed by a
majority of the justices on the ques-
tion of the effect of the jury's possi-
ble consideration of what might
happen to the defendant if the jury
fails to reach a unanimous recom-
mendation of death. In Simmons v.
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994), the Supreme Court held, in
a plurality opinion, that when a
defendant's future dangerousness is
Issue No. 5276
at issue during the penalty phase of
a capital trial, the jury should be
told that the defendant is not eligi-
ble for parole under state law. In
Jones, the court told the jury that a
recommendation of life imprison-
ment meant imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. However,
the judge did not inform the jury
that, given the crime Jones was con-
victed of-kidnapping resulting in
death-the judge could not impose
"some other lesser sentence"
but could only impose life
imprisonment.
In the Simmons case, four justices
were concerned that the jury was
confused about the meaning of a
term of life imprisonment and that
the trial court's failure to clarify this
put the defendant at a disadvantage.
In another opinion regarding a
denial of a writ of certiorari, four
justices were troubled by a Texas
law that prevents a judge from
telling the jury that the defendant
would not be eligible for parole for
40 years should the jury not sen-
tence the defendant to death.
Brown v. Texas, 118 S.Ct. 354
(1997). In that opinion, Justice
Stevens wrote that such a law "tips
the scales in favor of a death sen-
tence." In addition, such a rule
makes it likely that a jury will spec-
ulate erroneously as to what will
happen to the defendant if the jury
fails to sentence him or her to
death. In such a situation, the jury
will likely err on the side of death.
In Jones v. United States, not only
is it likely that the jury erred on the
side of death, but affidavits from two
jurors confirm that this is what
actually happened.
Finally, this is the first case in
which the Supreme Court is asked
to evaluate nonstatutory aggravating
factors for a weighing jurisdiction.
Typically, only aggravating factors
approved by the legislature are used
in death penalty cases. Even where
such factors have been legislatively
enacted, courts review them to
ensure that the jury's discretion is
guided to avoid arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty. Thus the Court
may indicate the constitutionality of
the specific aggravating circum-
stances alleged in this case.
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